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FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LISTENING TO MORAL LISTENING
RoY TSENG*
INTRODUCTION

Michael Dowdle has written an informative and thoughtful paper
on comparative constitutionalism.1 The main goal of his paper is to
argue that Western scholars, especially those who work in the liberal
tradition, should try to sympathize with the perspectives of nonWestern constitutional systems if they wish to enrich their understanding of constitutional practices. To support this goal, Dowdle
makes three major points in the paper. First, he argues that the dominant liberal methodology in the study of comparative constitutionalism
is deficient because it concentrates solely on the structural architectures associated with liberal constitutional culture and leaves untouched the diversified ends of constitutionalism.2 Secondly, to clarify
non-liberal constitutional discourses in a fuller sense, he develops an
alternative methodology, "constitutional listening," which is derived
largely from the interpretive principle of charity.3 Finally, he illustrates
the methodological merits of constitutional listening by referring to a
specific constitutional discourse generated by China's draft property
law between 2005 and 2007.4
Although I appreciate Dowdle's effort to empathetically engage
non-Western values while avoiding the error that Michael Walzer refers to as "covering law universalism,"s I do not completely agree with
his claims about (1) the cognitive limits of the liberal vision of constitutionalism; (2) the real purpose of comparative constitutionalism; and
(3) the historical features of Chinese political and legal discourses. In
the following, I will try to exchange ideas with him by elucidating my
views on these three issues respectively.
Professor of Political Theory, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Taiwan.
1. Michael W. Dowdle, ConstitutionalListening, 88 CHI-KENT L. REV. 115 (2012).
2. Id.at 116-21.
3. Id. at 121-38.
4. Id. at 142-48.
s. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD
(1994).
*
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HISTORICIST LIBERALISM

According to Dowdle, the cognitive limits of liberal constitutionalism are dual. First, liberal constitutionalism often conflates the moral
ends of constitutionalism with the institutional means that may help
realize those ends.6 Secondly, liberals assume that in understanding
non-Western constitutional experiences, we should focus our attention
on a set of institutional structures, such as judicial independence, separation of powers, rule of law, and multi-party electoral competition,
regardless of the different ends of constitutionalism pursued by various countries.7 However, as Dowdle continues, the institutional features of liberal constitutionalism that a number of Western
researchers take for granted arose out of the specific American constitutional experience, and therefore do not serve other parts of the
world well.8 What is worse, just because the liberals are historically
blind, their identification of constitutionalism with a specific list of
institutional structures alleges that these institutional structures signify the only possible way of achieving their assigned constitutional
ends. In this sense, they commit what David Sciulli has coined the "fallacy of exhausted possibilities" within the context of comparative constitutional law discourse.9 In short, the liberals are led to believe that
through a series of institution-based analyses, Western liberal constitutionalism would eventually achieve "the end of history," to use
Frances Fukuyama's infamous phrase.
These arguments raise a number of questions for me. To begin
with, I think Dowdle is definitely correct in remarking that our practices and institutions are embodiments of a certain cluster of human purposes and beliefs, and thus, in search for the justification of
constitutionalism, we must be concerned with its moral ends. In this
regard, it seems plain that liberalism or the liberal vision of constitutionalism, so to speak, contains two fundamental elements, namely
liberal values and liberal institutions. That said, liberalism as a form of
moral and political theory premised on the basic values of human dignity, human rights, political equality, and so forth is related to, but not
identical with, liberalism as a particular institutional arrangement for
exercising and realizing those values.
See Dowdle, supra note 1, at 116-17.
Id. at 115.
Seeid.atl116-19.
See DAVID SCIULLI, A THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATIONS OF A NONMARXIST CRITICAL THEORY 9-10 (1992).
6.
7.
8.
9.
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More to the point, in considering the characteristics of liberalism,
we also need to draw attention to the nature of philosophizing disclosed by liberal thinkers. In contrast to the narrowest reading of liberalism that Dowdle seems to have followed, there appear to be
several alternative groupings of liberalisms in contemporary political
theory. To name only a few, we have Richard Rorty's Kantian liberalism vs. Hegelian liberalism;io John Gray's Enlightenment liberalism vs.
agonistic liberalism;11 and Charles Taylor's procedural liberalism vs.
communitarian liberalism.12 For my purpose, it is sufficient to indicate
that all of these writers agree that the meaning of liberalism has been
redefined at least in part by a growing sense of its historicity,a sense
that increases our awareness of the plurality of ways of life and forms
of thinking (including liberalism itself) in the modern secularized
world. As a result, it may not be inappropriate if, in the discussion that
follows, I reformulate the two faces of liberalism as historicist liberalism vs. universalist liberalism.
Based on the distinction between liberal values and liberal institutions and the two categories of liberalism which I have identified, it
seems to me that Dowdle's examination of liberal constitutionalism is
liable to fall victim to the "fallacy of exhausted possibilities" in the
same way. For one thing, Dowdle's adopted meaning of liberalism actually reflects only a particular aspect of liberalism; namely, that of the
Enlightenment project.13 In other words, the vision of liberalism depicted by Dowdle reiterates nothing more than the ethos of covering
law universalism, according to which there are objective liberal values
that can be realized in every corner of the world by establishing liberal
institutions. Alternatively, we could say that the kind of liberalism he
has in mind echoes what Charles Taylor terms the "primacy-of-right"
theory,14 which is premised on the notion of the "disengaged self' or
"right bearing subject" conceived by modern mainstream philosophies,
including both Kantianism and Utilitarianism.
By contrast, it is the premise of historicist liberalism that human
thought and actions are historically conditioned, and that in under-

10.

See generally RICHARD RORTY, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, in 1 OBJECTIVITY,

RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 197, 197-202 (1991).
11. JOHN GRAY, Two FACES OF LIBERALISM 29-32 (2000).
12. Charles Taylor, Shared and Divergent Values, in OPTIONS FOR A NEW CANADA 53, 66-72
(Ronald L.Watts and Douglas M. Brown eds., 1991).
13. Dowdle, supra note 1, at 124-25.
14. See CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL

PAPERS 187,passim (1985).
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standing other cultures we should take historicity and contextuality
seriously if we are to empathize with ways of life that are set apart
from our own experience. Further, while historicist liberalism so understood would thereby be immune from Dowdle's criticisms on the
end-of-history myth, it attempts to reevaluate the moral import of liberalism and its adaptability to non-Western societies at the same time.
That is to say, despite pressing serious charges against universalist
liberalism, historicist liberals would not straightforwardly deny the
moral values of liberalism and the practical meanings of its institutional designs from top to bottom.
For example, in terms of moral and political thinking, Taylor's position can be read as a historicist reconstruction of liberal values, rather than a total rejection of liberalism. One commentator accurately
writes that "Taylor endorses the liberal concern with rights and autonomy, and joins liberals in reflecting on the meaning of freedom and the
social and political conditions propitious to its attainment," and that
"the politics of recognition can be seen as continuing the traditional
liberal concern with how a society can peacefully accommodate significant and enduring differences among its population with minimal recourse to coercion."is Taylor also adopts some significant aspects of
liberal institutions, such as "openness, participation and deliberation,"
into his vision of republican democracy.16
Seen from the perspective of historicist liberalism, then, the real
issue running through the prospect of liberalism points to the question
of whether liberalism is still morally important and practically significant when facing the clash of civilizations and when engaging in the
ongoing enterprise of cross-cultural interlocution. With this understanding, the major limits of Dowdle's paper lie in its failure to carefully ponder at least two crucial interrogations posed by historicist
liberals. Whereas the first question for the most part has to do with
how to avoid extreme cultural relativism by bringing into focus the
historical development of "the whole chain of civilization,"17 the second question involves the historical practices of Western political
ideas in non-Western societies. In the following two sections, I will
discuss these questions in turn.

15. RUTH ABBEY, CHARLES TAYLOR 148 (2000).
16. Id.
17. JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, Treatise on the Origin of Language, in PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS 65, 154 (Michael N. Forster ed., trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1772).
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II. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE

Let me begin with the first question in relation to the real purpose
of comparative constitutionalism that Dowdle identifies in his project
of constitutional listening. First and foremost, as Dowdle remarks, constitutional listening is concerned with a process of learning how to
listen charitably to the constitutional discourses of other societies.18 It
does this by understanding them as coherent systems of ideas that can
help to explain the complex ways of life in alien cultures. More specifically, the principle of charity underlining constitutional listening suggests that we should empathetically listen to a speaker with reference
to a specific set of ideas, and interpret his or her words in their most
reasonable light. As a result, in understanding Chinese constitutional
discourse, for example, we should not only take ideas seriously, but
also be aware that the ideas that matter can be liberal, non-liberal
(such as Confucianism), or even anti-liberal (such as Maoism and
Marxism). Since the social-constitutional meanings of the ideas under
interpretation, as we have seen, consist in their practical usages, Dowdle thus concludes that to truly understand the coherence of a constitutional discourse, we must look for its unique ways of thinking and
acting, that is, to treat the very discourse as a concrete universe of ideas.19
I have suggested that following historicist liberalism, I cannot
agree more with Dowdle concerning the historicist insights that he
unveils in the case of undertaking comparative constitutionalism. In
fact, following Vico, Herder, Wittgenstein, Oakeshott, Berlin, Taylor,
and many otherS,20 I firmly believe that the political and legal idioms
we adhere to are manifestations of our own historical experience; thus,
we have to pay serious attention to this experience and the idioms it
has generated if we wish to understand the meanings of a political or
legal concept. Nor is it surprising that my historicist position has encouraged me to follow in the footsteps of some historicist liberals to
embark on a cross-cultural dialogue.
Theoretically, the real difference between Dowdle and I is that I
have a different view on the ethical desirability of accepting the core
liberal value of human dignity as the common moral ground across
cultures, or the historical plausibility of establishing quasi-liberal insti18.
19.
20.
ty, in THE

See Dowdle, supra note 1, at 125-30.
Seee.g.,id.at155-56.
See generally Roy Tseng, Conservatism, Romanticism, and the Understanding of ModerniMEANINGS OF MICHAEL OAKESHOTT'S CONSERVATISM 126 (Corey Abel ed., 2010).
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tutions in the Chinese world. Before briefly touching on the second
issue, there are two problems stemming from the first issue that need
to be spelled out. First, should we remain morally neutral when conducting cross-cultural understanding? And second, is there really no
moral linkage at all between traditional Chinese thought such as Confucianism and liberal values in spite of the cultural differences between
the two civilizations?
I am prepared to make some comments on the principle of charity
so as to support my observation on the moral significance of cultural
encounters. I raise this issue because the proposal of constitutional
listening seems to rest on an assumption of the primacy of epistemology. In other words, the principle of charity, as used by Dowdle, is nothing more than a set of epistemic principles that keep the interpreters
away from deeper moral evaluation. As Dowdle explains, his major
purpose in mapping out constitutional listening is to interpret the alien
constitutional system in a way that is coherent with that society's existing understanding, without affecting the way in which its members
actually understand it.
This implies that for Dowdle, constitutional listening is by and
large about learning and understanding constitutionalism, rather than
about judging and evaluating the political and legal systems of other
cultures. Put another way, although Dowdle grants that communication across political and legal systems is possible, he nevertheless
keeps a tight rein on the principle of charity as a morally neutral tool to
appreciate alternative, non-liberal discourses. The insistence on moral
neutrality becomes even clearer when Dowdle rebuts the skeptical
view about the possibility of truly understanding others' ways of life.
According to Dowdle, the skeptics in question fall short of realizing the
methodological point that human beings do in fact share similar perceptions and cognitions-"[w]hat differs among cultures is the way
perception and cognition is expressed and not differences in perception or cognition per se."21 Consequently, these skeptics are inattentive
to the epistemological stance which holds that we can distinguish
"conceptual coherence" making sense to the interpreters from the
'moral agreement" that we deliver to those ideas under interpretation,
such as Chinese socialism or Chinese democracy.
Even in the age of value pluralism, the attempt to avoid moral
judgment in understanding others' cultures is not always sustainable,

21. Dowdle,supra note 1, at 131-32.
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insofar as extreme cultural relativism or radical moral nihilism is still
one of the most intricate philosophical issues that we should deal with
nowadays. Instead of delving into this issue, nevertheless, I only intend
to remark that if we stick to the principle of charity as being content
with existing understanding, we are likely to confine our research to
empirical explanation or select subject matter for its "epistemological
tractability" alone.22 As is often the case, however, what comes from
"epistemological tractability" is a not a true comprehension of other's
cultures, but a naive exercise in "objective research" that is in danger of
succumbing to the most extreme form of cultural relativism or moral
nihilism. To take an obvious example, millions of female babies were
killed in mainland China for reasons that Western people are not incapable of objectively grasping: China's one-child procreation policy and
the Chinese custom that favors boys over girls. What should really be
questioned in this typical case is the moral wrong of killing newborn
children, not the search for conceptual coherence.
At this point, Dowdle would reply that the reason why he insists
on moral neutrality is to avoid Western cultural hegemony in the sense
of accounting for Chinese constitutional discourse simply from the
Western point of view. However, my observation is that considering
the historical features of modern Chinese political and legal discourses,
it would be inadequate, if not absurd, to treat liberalism, socialism, or
Marxism as distinctively Western concepts. I will return to this issue
shortly. For now, I just want to conclude that even though overcoming
Western cultural hegemony is the right thing for us to do, it does not
necessarily follow that we should give up the hope of discovering some
basic human values linking "the whole chain of civilization."23
Seen in this light, the question that really bothers me is this: if
human beings do share similar perceptions and cognitions, as Dowdle
powerfully remarkS,24 I cannot see why they are unable to share similar moral understandings that would enable them to agree on a cluster
of core values. In other words, it is my reading that on balance, Dowdle
gives us no sufficient reason to maintain that there is an asymmetry
between human epistemic perception and human moral reasoning. On
the contrary, it seems to me that the same reasoning he uses to transcend epistemic skepticism might work to explain away the moral skepticism that he employs in his paper. That is, to rephrase his statement
22.

See JOHN DUNN, INTERPRETING POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIEs 3 (1990).

23.
24.

See von Herder, supra note 17.
See Dowdle, supra note 1, at 131-32.
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in moral terms, human beings share an ability to reason morally: "what
differs among cultures are the particular metaphors and symbols used
to express and communicate these [values]."25
This immediately brings up the most difficult problem regarding
cross-cultural dialogue: the search for the common moral ground that
may justify different reasons given by different parties engaged in the
conversation of mankind. From the standpoint I have been taking, it is
clear that the present difficulty of cultural encounters actually arises
from the fact that people from different cultural backgrounds are still
not ready-to use Charles Taylor's famous words-to empathize with
the "moral sources" that lend significance to the ways of life of other
people; it is not because they are unable to understand each other, as
Dowdle suggests. In short, the problem is not at the level of epistemology but at the level of moral ontology. It is for this reason that Taylor
urges us to "overcome epistemology" if we really wish to discover
some "transcendental" values for human beings.26
On this occasion, instead of giving a detailed account of Taylor's
moral theory, it is sufficient to note that for the historicist thinkers like
Taylor, the tensions between civilizations do not affect the truth that
"we can and should struggle for a 'transvaluation' (to borrow Nietzsche's term, Umwertung) which could open the way to a mode of life,
individual and social, in which [our moral] demands could be reconciled."27 To make the case that a more sophisticated way of reaching
"the whole chain of civilization" is still available, Taylor has tried to
address the problem of "ethnocentricity." In general, and following
Herder on this point, Taylor's view is that we can sympathize with another's way of life via "a language of perspicuous contrast":
This would be a language in which we could formulate both their
way of life and ours as alternative possibilities in relation to some
human constants at work in both. It would be a language in which
the possible human variations would be so formulated that both our
form of life and theirs could be perspicuously described as alternative such variations. Such a language of contrast might show their
language of understanding to be distorted or inadequate in some respects, or it might show ours to be (in which case, we might find that
understanding them leads to an alteration or our self-understanding,

2 5.

Id.

26. See CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 18-19 (1995).
27. Charles Taylor, Reply and Re-articulation, in PHILOSOPHY IN AN AGE OF PLURALISM: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES TAYLOR IN QUESTION 213, 214 (lames Tulley ed., 1994).
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and hence our form of life - a far from unknown process in history);
or it might show both to be SO.28
Here, it should be noted that in Taylor's opinion, for "human constants" to work, suitable basis for undertaking cross-cultural dialogue
are moral sources and their constitutive goods, rather than a set of
abstract rules guaranteed by modern epistemological criteria, as the
former, but not the latter, can truly give meaning to the different ways
of life in question.
That said, for Taylor, the clash of civilizations is not the last word,
as he believes that there does exist a common moral ground across
civilizations. Alternatively, it can be said that although he is abandoning covering law universalism, Taylor is still advocating a historicist
reconstruction of universal ethics, maintaining that even though human goods are plural, "some goods do feature in all moral codes and
are strongly valued by all cultures."29 Thus, Taylor certainly does not
think that the idea of basic human values is already out of our reach in
the age of pluralism. For example, as he remarks, "[e]very moral system has a conception of what we might call human dignity... of the
quality which, in man, compels us to treat him with respect, or... a
conception which defines what it is to have respect for human beings."30 Compared with Taylor's insights, it appears that the version of
constitutional listening offered by Dowdle is epistemic listening, not
value listening, or still less, moral listening.
It is largely for this reason that in constructing his epistemicbased project of constitutional listening, Dowdle takes for granted that
the Western and Chinese worlds represent two incommensurable systems of values and that liberalism and Confucianism stand for two incompatible worlds of ideas. In sharp contrast to that presumption, my
suggestion is that, in the deepest ontological sense, the traditions do
share the common ground of human dignity.
Considering my purpose here, I am unable to invite readers to listen morally to the conversation between liberalism and Confucianism
in any great detail. Instead, I only wish to mention that considering the
compatibility of liberalism and Confucianism actually has a long history. Mencius has often been taken as a good starting point for such an

28.

CHARLES TAYLOR, Understanding and Ethnocentricity, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN

SCIENCES 116, 125-26 (1985).
29. See Abbey, supra note 15, at 22.
30. Charles Taylor, Human Rights: The Legal Culture,in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OFHUMAN
RIGHTS 49, 53 (1986).
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endeavor.31 It is commonly believed that Mencius made significant
progress in filling the philosophical lacunae in Chinese legacy and that
he did great service in systematizing the Confucian doctrine. Furthermore, it is basically to the credit of contemporary Neo-Confucianism
that the philosophical resemblances that Mencius bears with liberal
thinking about the moral subject have become widely recognized.
What these strands of reflection suggest is that underlying Mencius'
moral theory is exactly the idea of human dignity understood in the
liberal sense that we human beings are morally equal and should take
responsibility for our own decisions and actions. Thus, my feeling is
that Chinese people following the wisdom of Confucius, Mencius, and
others are not fundamentally different from Westerners in their desire
to respect the dignity of all human beings as rational creatures capable
of establishing civilizations.
III. THE HISTORICAL RECEPTION OF WESTERN POLITICAL VOCABULARIES

So far, I have indicated that although I strongly endorse Dowdle's
stress on the importance of social context for understanding another
culture, two insights that are regrettably missing in the project of constitutional listening are (1) the ethical desirability of liberal values in
the cross-cultural venue, and (2) the practical plausibility for acclimatizing some liberal institutions into Chinese societies. It can be added
that my less pessimistic expectation for Western political and legal
thought in general and for liberalism in particular has to do with my
view of the influence of Western metaphors and symbols on modern
Chinese public thinking and practice.
In general, my premise is that in the Chinese context, the major
political and legal vocabularies that we use-including constitution,
the rule of law, power, the state, democracy, rights, social justice, liberalism, and socialism-originate from Europe. In some sense, I agree
with Oakeshott's remark that " 'European' has become an adjective
which refers to something which may be found in any part of the
world."32 However, in the course of cultural encounters, the political
and legal idioms in question have changed their original meanings as
they have become incorporated into the Chinese way of life. As the
31. Mencius (372-289 B.C.?) has traditionally been regarded as the Second Sage in the
history of Confucianism. He studied with a disciple of Confucians' grandson, Tzu Ssu, and his
sayings and conversations have been recorded in a book called MENClus, probably by his disciples.
32.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Europe, the Emergence of an Idea, in WHAT IS HISTORY? AND OTHER

ESSAYS 429, 436 (Luke O'Sullivan, ed., 2004) (1981).
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linguistic context at stake is largely formulated by Chinese culture as
well as Western perspectives in modern China (as in many other modern Asian countries), we are primarily obligated to examine the unique
ways in which Western political and legal vocabularies have been culturally "translated" into the Chinese-speaking world so as to better
understand modern Chinese political thinking. In any case, it seems
undeniable that modern China has undergone a linguistic revolution
with respect to morality and politics, mainly caused by European imperialism, among many other factors. Thus, we must be aware of the
originality of the concepts of constitution or rule of law in the first
place when listening to Chinese constitutionalism.
From my perspective, it appears that Dowdle has overlooked the
fact that "European" as a worldwide adjective has already been "here"
for a considerable length of time. As a result of this, he simply ignores
that long before the coming of socialism, liberalism had reached the
mind of Chinese intellectuals-the translation of Mill's On Liberty, for
instance, appeared in 1903-and more importantly, he also ignores the
fact that in modern China there is a lasting "moral anxiety" driven from
the deepest civilization crisis caused by Western imperialism. A famous contemporary philosopher, for example, has borrowed Alasdair
MacIntyre's conception of "epistemological crisis" to illustrate the current condition of Chinese culture,33 purporting to entail that in the
actual world in which Chinese people inhabit the language of morality,
the system of beliefs, and even the way of life, are in "the same state of
grave disorder."34
Seen in this light, it not only turns out that Dowdle's claim that
"liberalism has not played a significant role on modern China's political
history or experiences" is untrue, but it is also evident that his exclusion of liberal voices from the understanding of Chinese constitutional
discourses is arbitrary. Dowdle neglects the long-term historical efforts
that Chinese intellectuals have actually made to accommodate some
liberal visions in an effort to resolve their moral anxiety. For me, the
success of Taiwan's effort to establish democracy, a free society, and a
self-constrained state that protects human rights is not purely accidental but is the fruit of historical practices. Again, the liberals in China
(which is not necessarily identified with the confusing name new33. YUAN-KANGSHIH [ER5E], FROM CHINESE CULTURE TO MODERNITY: THE SHIFT OF PARADIGMS
iti: AiM4] 26 (1998). For the idea of "epistemological crisis," see Alasdair
[VP1 W3Zitt
MacIntyre, Epistemological Crisis, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science, in PARADIGMS
AND REVOLUTIONS 54, passim (Gary Gutting, ed., 1980).
34. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 2 (2d ed., 1984).
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Right) are not unreflective fans of Frances Fukuyama, but selfconscious descendants of a fresh tradition of Chinese liberalism in development.
This account, along with the reasons I have already explicated, do
not support the conclusion that liberal concern about human rights
simply represent a form of Western hegemony, which is meaningless
or even harmful in Chinese-speaking societies. Provided that the recent
rise of China means that the People's Republic of China ("PRC") has
now endorsed capitalism of some sort, it appears that the question we
should ask next is not simply how to explain the empirical phenomena
by showing how financially satisfied Chinese people are currently. Rather, it is imperative for a political theorist working in a Chinese context to embark on a cross-cultural dialogue so as to help explain the
moral anxiety with which China as a historically established civilization is still confusingly confronted at the moment.
While doing so, we surely have no reason to exclude the socialist
promise from the dialogue. Regarding the debate over the draft of the
property law of PRC, I think Dowdle is definitely correct in remarking
that the term "constitution" has its unique social meaning and political
force in PRC.3s He is also correct that Gong Xiantian actually stands up
for many Chinese peasants and working class people in arguing that
the neo-Right's attempt to prioritize the development of the private
economy over the public economy would be contrary to China's constitutional status as a socialist polity. Further, Dowdle correctly recognizes that Xiantian argues that to take better care of economic equality, to
restrict the income gap in society, to decrease fraud and corruption in
pursuit of private wealth, and to remain the socialist public-property
system, Chinese Communism "must create a socialist legal civilization
that carries [Chinese] national characteristics."36
Be that as it may, abiding by the principle of charity, Dowdle is
content with existing understanding. That is, his purpose is to argue
that while China's left tradition reiterated by Gong has been dismissed
out of hand in the liberal version of constitutionalism, his project of
constitutional listening can go some way to filling the lacuna.
From my standpoint, however, there have been two opinions that
need to be reiterated. On the one hand, given the historical features of
the modern Chinese linguistic milieu that I have briefly sketched, I
35. Dowdle, supra note 1, at 143-48.
36. Id. at 150 (citing Gong Xiantian, A PropertyLaw (Draft)that Violates the Constitution and
Basic Principles of Socialism, in 29 LINKS: INT'L J.OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL (May-Aug., 2006)).
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doubt that the liberals in the broadest sense, including Chinese liberals
and Western ones, would have epistemic problems with understanding
what Dowdle refers to as a "distinctly Chinese Marxism."37 By contrast,
my understanding is that both a "distinctly Chinese Marxism" and "a
distinctly Chinese liberalism" symbolize half-truth in understanding
modern Chinese political and legal discourses. Neither liberalism nor
Marxism is a product of Chinese political thought; in the course of cultural encounters, nevertheless, they have gradually become an indispensable part of it. Following Oakeshott's observation that a proper
understanding of a complex historic alloy is to be reached by identifying the frontiers-which protects the identity of the manner of thinking concerned-I conclude that as far as modern China is concerned,
the frontiers in question are by and large a "distinctly Chinese Marxism" and "a distinctly Chinese liberalism."
On the other hand, it follows that modern Chinese moral outlooks
are still developing in the wake of these two dramatic cultural upheavals. Being a Taiwanese political thinker whose mother tongue is Chinese, I must confess that for me, what really gets in the way of
undertaking the peace dialogue between China and Taiwan is the tension between the two different ways of life shaped by a "distinctly Chinese Marxism" and "a distinctly Chinese liberalism" respectively.
Indeed, China is now in transition. In defending historicist liberalism,
nevertheless, I am not saying that the China of the future must be converted into a liberal regime in order to achieve civility. But still, unlike
Dowdle's claim of "moral humility," it does seem morally wrong for me
if China remains an authoritarian regime that continues to intimidate
Taiwan's democracy and sovereignty and violate its own people's basic
human rights. In short, it is my view that without considering the idea
of human dignity or its political expression, namely civil and political
rights, market-oriented economic development might culminate in an
authoritarian regime in association with nationalism and militarism,
which in turn would not only damage liberalism itself but also usher
political evils into the world.
In Western experience, there are many things that liberals may
have learned from socialism; the idea of a welfare state is just one example. At the end of the day, I presume, the new left in China is likewise required to answer the question of whether the liberal
assumption that human beings are equal, because they share the ra-
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tional capacity to decide for themselves what is good for them, is truly
alien to Chinese culture.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, it is my view that to properly understand the moral
anxiety with which the Chinese people have long been confronted, we
must seek a cross-cultural dialogue such that the common moral
ground can be revealed. If this is the case, then for the purpose of comparative political theory, I believe that the main task of political theorists working in the Chinese world is not to reject the Western
perspectives for the sake of nationalism or anti-Western hegemony,
but to listen carefully to Western voices and ascertain whether these
alien values resonate with our own moral habits in significant ways.
Evidently, the process of cross-cultural dialogue is full of difficulties
and uncertainties; in my opinion, it even appears to be an endless task
with no final destination. Nevertheless, what follows from moral anxiety and epistemic opacity is merely that the West and the East must
continue learning how to make better judgments in this historically
given world and to appreciate each other's moral resources.

